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The history of the Kosovo war is not the only case of missed opportunities for preventive action, but it is certainly one of the most dramatic. As early as 1991, or at the latest in 1992 with the publication of the book by Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal with the telling title „Kosovo: The Gordian Knot of the Balkans“, it was clear to anyone studying the situation that there would one day be an attempt to adopt Alexander the Great's approach to unfastening the knot. This attempt was made seven years later, costing thousands of lives and resulting in the apparently permanent expulsion of 231,000 people, as well as massive destruction, large-scale and long-term environmental damage, fresh hostilities (e.g. between the Kosovo Albanians and Roma), and continuing acts of „ethnic cleansing“. (The only factor which could not be predicted in 1992 was that one of the potential parties to the conflict would eventually succeed in drawing an international organisation such as NATO into the conflict, thereby deciding the outcome in its own favour.)
There is no doubt that under different circumstances, given the likely escalation of tensions, external civilian intervention would have been possible in the years from 1992 to 1994. This could have paved the way for civilian approaches to resolving the protracted ethnic/national conflict between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and the Belgrade government. To this end, it would have been essential to establish an efficient, internationally controlled Supreme Court for Kosovo, possibly with several subordinate administrative courts, set up on a non-ethnic basis, whose jurisprudence would have complied with international human rights laws. In addition, an international police force and stronger OSCE intervention would have been required. The latter was eventually attempted in late 1998, six months after the war began, but only partially realised.
„But the Serbian leadership in Belgrade would have never allowed this type of intervention!“ This is the most likely objection to this concept. Certainly, the Serbian leadership would have resisted such a move. Yet assuming that this temporary measure would not have been decided by NATO (which would not have been the body responsible anyway), or declared opponents of Yugoslav socialism, but by an UN body which was already recognised by Yugoslavia and held a legitimate mandate, and also assuming that acceptance of the measure would have brought clear economic and political advantages for Serbia and the Kosovo Serbs, then this intervention, in my opinion, would have had realistic chances of being implemented, even under Milosevic.
The costs of this intervention would have been merely a fraction of the actual expense of the Kosovo war and the year-on-year costs of deploying KFOR troops now and in the foreseeable future. In other words, the money was - and is - available, or would have been available if the „international community“ had been aware of the immense financial - and, indeed, political - burdens that they would incur just a few years later once military intervention came to be regarded as the only solution.
Obviously, since we are dealing with „virtual“ developments, the effectiveness of such measures cannot be proven today. However, assuming it could be proven, NATO's military intervention was doubly unethical. Alongside all the arguments put forward in this present volume against NATO's justification of its attack on Serbia on ethical grounds - i.e. the need to defend the human rights of the Kosovo Albanians (which indeed had to be defended!) - one more argument can be added: It is ethically unjustifiable to wait for a development which is highly likely to result in expulsions on ethnic grounds under the threat of massive collective violence, and only to intervene once the first massacres have taken place in order to "stop the killing!"
Why was no conclusion drawn from this simple insight in the case of Kosovo, as in almost every other comparable case so far, namely that prevention is imperative on ethical and economic grounds when violent conflict is clearly foreseeable? (Only a few sections of western European civil society tried to influence the Belgrade government and/or support the non-violent resistance of the Kosovo Albanians. ) There are three answers to this question: one is socio-psychological, one is pragmatic and one concerns international law.
The socio-psychological answer is as follows: preventive action by governments is likely only when there is a clear, precise and timely public recognition of the acute danger of escalation. In the years between 1992 and 1996, when there was still a good chance of transforming the conflict constructively without military involvement, there was a failure to convey this recognition - which was widespread among the committed parts of Western civil society and, at least, among OSCE diplomats - through the media in a way which would force the European governments to take action.
The pragmatic answer is as follows: There are currently an estimated 1000 crisis regions worldwide. There were probably no fewer in 1992/93. Due to the sheer abundance of cases, the UN Security Council generally reacts only when the flames of conflict are already burning - by which time, of course, it is too late for preventive action.
The answer in international law is as follows: In line with Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council could have legitimately assumed that the threat of genocide or other crimes against humanity posed an impending „threat to world peace“, and thus taken action. However, in spite of the current tendency to expand the scope of application of this Article, the Security Council could not bring itself to arrive at such a far-reaching interpretation in relation to the recognisable but not yet acute threat in Kosovo in 1992. The international legal mandate to take preventive measures that restrict the sovereignty of states was thus absent during the decisive years of the Kosovo conflict (1992-1996).
As far as the socio-psychological and the pragmatic levels are concerned, some initial steps are becoming visible: The United Nations Secretary-General has set up a special Early Warning Unit which guarantees much earlier recognition of probable dramatic developments and alerts the highest levels of power. Another example is the European Union's Crisis Prevention Programme. As a consequence of the crisis in late 1998, when it became impossible to provide the required number of 5000 OSCE workers in Kosovo within the given time limits, the OSCE budget was substantially increased at the Istanbul Summit in November 1999. However, at the level of international law, nothing has been done so far.
It is of course understandable from a human point of view that some experts in international law were deeply disillusioned by its violation on 24 March 1999, the day when the former Yugoslavia was attacked , and by the upheavals in international law during the aftermath of 11 September 2001 , as well as by Israel’s continued and unpunished breach of the Geneva Convention . Firstly, however, even today, there is still consistent recourse to international law , e.g. the securing of a Security Council mandate for the attacks on Afghanistan by the USA and the UK. Secondly, international law has been effective in the past as a means of at least mitigating violence, even during the terror of the National Socialist regime . Thirdly, it is better to have an only partially enforceable body of international law than none at all while there is still no democratically legitimate international monopoly on the use of force: for if the "major" powers act on the basis that "might is right", the "minor" powers cannot be expected to follow the law. In this sense, there is certainly an indirect connection between NATO's actions in 1999 and the events of 11 September 2001. This top-down effect applies to all levels of society. So if international law did not exist, it would have to be invented.
What could and should happen on the level of international law, then, in order to create a legal framework for preventive, non-military measures which nonetheless restrict the sovereignty of states? Is the Security Council mandate laid down in the UN Charter not sufficient for such measures?
Firstly, as mentioned above, the UN Security Council reacts almost exclusively ex post facto, i.e. when a conflict has already developed into a tangible threat to world peace. Secondly, this body is defined by political interests which are not necessarily driven by rule of law imperatives or general principles of non-violence. If the Security Council is unable to react for political reasons, yet individual states or international alliances want to and are capable of intervening, they should not - indeed, they must not - take it upon themselves to do so, as in Kosovo, even if the violation of basic human rights is very dramatic and obvious (which was certainly not the case in Kosovo in the months before the NATO operation started ). Any action should be taken only after careful consideration by a legitimate international body. The establishment of a United Nations Intervention Council (UNIC) or a World Intervention Court, as has been suggested by others, is therefore urgently called for.
Candidates for appointment to this Council could be nominated by the national parliaments or supreme courts; the UN General Assembly could then elect members based on these nominations . The UNIC would require close institutional interlinking with existing Early Warning Systems , making it obligatory for it to react according to clear rules and within a fixed timeframe, in the case of foreseeable traumatic events, if at least three of these systems indicate the danger of genocides or crimes against humanity. International NGOs should also be given the right to press charges. Furthermore, its mandate should not be restricted to guaranteeing the legitimacy of an external intervention, i.e. measures restricting the sovereignty of a state; it should also be able to decide the means by which any intervention can and should be lawfully conducted, such as conflict training with a broad outreach, mediation, human rights monitoring, international police and internationally controlled courts.
1. One might ask: What is the „added value“ of a new UN body, when the ultimate power to decide whether the decisions of this body are implemented lies with the Security Council and/or with national governments? Response: Merely the fact that oppressed minorities or NGOs which are familiar with and monitor their problems would be able to approach a formally established international agency would be a significant improvement on the present situation. It would enable the actors to refer to decisions and recommendations by this body in their involvement in the political process. Such decisions would at least disqualify the excuse that action is "unfortunately" impossible due to the lack of a mandate and the restrictions of international law (as was repeatedly claimed in response to Rugova’s futile appeals for international support to the Kosovo Albanians' non-violent resistance). Finally, as long as international law were respected, it would be possible to prohibit unlawful actions which have devastating consequences, such as the NATO intervention in 1999, when the pretext of having to act in an emergency situation in abeyance of the law was used.
2. A further possible objection is that the vast number of acute conflicts worldwide could block the UNIC or overburden its capacities just as much as they do presently in the Security Council. Response: The procedures and the actual capacities would need to be tested first. If there is too much for the UNIC to handle, the UN's regional organisations, such as the OSCE, could be given a mandate to set up their own intervention councils. In this case, the UNIC would function as an appeal body.
3. „Considering the political interests of the permanent Security Council members, it is improbable that the Security Council would voluntarily surrender any of its de facto pre-democratic, absolutist powers to such a body.“ Response: This is probably true; however, the same could be said of almost all the proposals put forward in the recent democratisation debate in the UN. Nonetheless, the debate remains essential and is a precondition for the necessary changes in the desired direction at some point in future, probably in the wake of political failures or even crises.
4. „If there is no military pressure behind measures that restrict the sovereignty of states, the Milosevics of this world will never allow other governments to intervene in their affairs. Since no government in the world would welcome external intervention, except in the interests of their own survival, the other governments will not be keen to react, so finally everything will remain on paper.“ Response: With the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), a milestone has already been reached. There is no doubt that the minimum number of ratifications required for the ICC to be established will be achieved. Similarly, the establishment of a body such as the UNIC would also have a positive impact so that in future, even the most hardened power-hungry politicians and world powers would recognise that it is not in their interests to stay on the sidelines. Even if the only governments initially supporting the establishment of an international intervention council, within the framework of international agreements (such as the International Criminal Court), were those which are highly unlikely to face any threat of intervention in response to massive human rights violation thanks to their long-term stability, a great deal would be still achieved. There are no guarantees that the situation in any country will remain stable. (Even in the EU Member States, recurrences of quasi-Fascist conditions are still conceivable in the long term.) In such a case, a voluntary commitment by the nation states greatly facilitates the prevention of violence in future domestic conflicts - with the cooperative involvement of external powers. The European Union is an example of how sanctions reached on the basis of consensus are effective, purely because they could potentially lead to the loss of reputation and further domestic or national disadvantages. It is therefore not necessary to use military pressure in the event of violations at all. Once the advantages of joining such a community of states who are prepared to forego temporarily certain stakes in their sovereignty under clearly defined circumstances are evident, even states which are currently more likely to face a situation in which these approved rules could be applied will ultimately join the organisation.
As it is hardly ethical for academics to put forward what they regard as plausible suggestions without any tangible action to follow them up, we have already embarked on the first practical steps. The „Linz Appeal for a Peace Politics“ contains, as its central innovative recommendation, the concept of setting up a United Nations Intervention Council (see annex). It has been signed by peace researchers, scientists, philosophers, political analysts, psychologists and international legal experts, as well as by prominent representatives from public life and Austrian parliamentarians. Other recommendations which promote similar aims are also worth considering in this context.
The first step towards the implementation of these recommendations is to initiate a broad public debate. It is also necessary to discuss all the recommendations and ideas with the appropriate staff at the UN and the OSCE and refine and strengthen the proposals, feeding the outcomes of this dialogue back into the public debate. This process has already begun. Only persistent work including test runs before the establishment of the Council can enable what currently may appear to be an utopian idea to become political reality at the appropriate historical moment in the future. No one can predict how long this process will take: perhaps one, two or even three decades. Yet that is precisely why we must embark on this task immediately.
It is clear that after the massive human rights violations in Kosovo, East Timor and Chechnya, new ways must be found to prevent war, mass murder and ethnic cleansing in the future.
We appeal to all governments, particularly those of neutral or non-aligned countries, totake the lead with the following initiatives for peace:
We need tangible steps in order to develop an international legal system which guarantees peace and human rights and prevents interventions that violate international law.
These initiatives will cost only a fraction of the expense resulting from Kosovo and its aftermath.
Peace and compassion are worth it!
The Linz Appeal for Peace Politics is supported so far by
Bishop Dr. h.c. Maximilian Aichern, Diocese of Linz; Prof. Dr. Ulrich Albrecht, Free University of Berlin (FU) and President of the German Society for Peace Research (AFK); Prof. Dr. Rudolf Ardelt, Principal of Johannes Kepler University, Linz; PD Dr. Thea Bauriedl, Institute for Political Psychoanalysis, Munich; Prof. Dr. Hanne M. Birckenbach, University of Giessen and Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Sciences (SCHIFF), Kiel; Prof. Dr. Lothar Brock, University of Frankfurt/M. and Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt (PRIF); Dr. John Bunzl, Austrian Institute for International Politics; Dr. Andreas Buro, Emeritus Professor, Grävenwiesbach/Ts. bei Frankfurt/M.; Dr. Ernst Otto Czempiel, Emeritus Professor. Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt (PRIF);. Dr. Franz Dobusch, Mayor of the City of Linz; Mag. Hansjörg Eichmeyer, Superintendent of the Protestant Church of Upper Austria; PD Dr. Tilman Evers, Forum for Civilian Peace Service, Kassel; Prof. Dr. Horst Fischer, Institute for International Law (Institut für Friedenssicherungsrecht und Humanitäres Völkerrecht), University of Bochum; Dr. Leo Gabriel, Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research on Latin America, Vienna,; Dr. Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, Emeritus Professor, Hamburg; Dr. Franz Gmainer-Pranzl, Theological University, Linz; Dr. Hildegard Goss-Mayr, Vienna, Honorary President of the International Fellowship for Reconciliation (IFOR), Dr. Erich Gumplmaier, Secretary of the Unions of Upper Austria; Prof. Dr. Josef Gunz, Johannes Kepler University, Linz; Father Karl Helmreich, OSB, refugee support worker, Stift Melk; Prof. Dr. Otmar Höll, Director of the Austrian Institute for International Politics (ÖIIP), Vienna; Mag. Hans Holzinger, Robert Jungk Library, Salzburg; Prof. Dr. Egbert Jahn, University of Mannheim; Prof. Dr. Gert Krell, University of Frankfurt/M.; Dr. Ekkehart Krippendorff, Emeritus Professor, Berlin; Franz Küberl, President of Austrian Caritas, Graz; Dr. Franz Leidenmühler, Institute for International Law, University of Linz; Dr. Gerald Mader, President of the Austrian Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschlaining (ÖSFK); Prof. Dr. Georg Meggle, Institute for Philosophy,University of Leipzig; Dr. Barbara Müller, Institute for Peace and Constructive Conflict Management, Wahlenau; Dr. Heinrich Noller, Emeritus Professor, Vienna; Prof. Dr. Franz Nuscheler, University of Duisburg; Helmolt Rademacher, Conflict Consultant for schools in the federal state of Hesse; Dr. Norbert Ropers, Director of the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin; Dr. Severin Renoldner, Catholic Action and Pax Christi, Upper Austria; Prof. Dr. Manfred Rotter, Institute for International Law, University of Linz; Prof. Dr. Hajo Schmidt, Hagen Open University; Prof. Dr. Dr. Rolf Schwendter, University of Kassel; Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Dieter Senghaas, University of Bremen; Prof. Dr. Eva Senghaas-Knobloch, University of Bremen; Prof. Dr. Dorothee Sölle, Publisher, Hamburg; Toni Steinmetz, Secretary of Metals and Textiles Union, Upper Austria; Dr. Reiner Steinweg, Acting Director of the Berghof Research Center for Conflict Management and Director of the Linz Institute for Peace Research; Helga Tempel (Ahrensburg/Hamburg), Forum for Civilian Peace Service; Konrad Tempel (Ahrensburg b. Hamburg), Society for Social Defence (Bund für Soziale Vertei-digung), Berlin; Dr. Christian Wellmann, Vice-Director of the Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Sciences (SCHIFF), Kiel; Dr. Erika Weinzierl, Emeritus Professor, University of Vienna; Hubert Wipplinger, President of the Chamber for Workers and Employees, Upper Austria (AK) and of the Unions of Upper Austria; Dr. Veronique Zanetti, University of Tübingen; Prof. Dr. Valentin Zsifkovits, University of Graz; Dr. Georg Zundel, Emeritus Professor, Salzburg/Munich. .
The Appeal has also been signed by almost every Member of Linz City Council, as well as – among others - the following Members of the Parliament of Upper Austria:
Deputy Prime Minister Erich Haider (SPÖ), the two Presidents of the Parliament, Angela Ortner (ÖVP) and Gerda Weichsler (SPÖ), and the chairmen of three parliamentary groups: Rudi Anschober (Greens), Dr. Karl Frais (SPÖ), and Dr. Josef Stockinger (ÖVP).